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Abstract 
 
 This paper seeks to enrich our ethical understanding of the built environment, planning, and urban policy by 
drawing on the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, particularly his concept of hospitality. Lévinas maintains that 
hospitality has an ethical meaning since it entails welcoming the other into one’s home while simultaneously 
respecting their strangeness. However, being hospitable puts the host in a vulnerable state vis-a-vis their guest. This 
ethical insight leads us to question the significance of the façade of a building as a flat exterior that frames or 
represents the contents of a building. Although Lévinas does not explicitly make this connection, I argue that the 
facade preserves the tension between the tendency of the house to draw its inhabitants inwards, and the event of 
welcoming a guest, who is introduced from the outside. This double movement suggests that the facade is a 
boundary. Boundaries are places of tension and conflict; however, these very qualities present the opportunity for 
the facade to be a space of hospitality. 
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Preface 
 Today, most of us live in cities. These built environments are composed of building facades, 
which, when viewed together, express the various conflicts – political, ethnic or economic – that 
characterize the city. Often, the city is understood as a space that merely contains these conflicts. 
However, as I argue in this paper, the relationship is deeper than this since the city, at its very 
core, is a conflictual structure. I would like to propose a perspective on the built environment that 
draws on ethical considerations in an attempt to enrich how we think about planning and urban 
policy. The starting point is the concept of hospitality proposed by the French philosopher 
Emmanuel Lévinas. For Lévinas, hospitality has an ethical dimension as it is an event that takes 
place between “I” and “other,” and it is characterized by the tension inherent to this relationship. 
To show hospitality is to welcome the other into one’s home while respecting their strangeness. 
This act puts the person who performs it in a vulnerable position. The concept of hospitality 
evolved in parallel with the development of Western culture. However, the underlying idea is 
present as a central theme in almost every religion and culture, and it therefore has various time 
and place dependent meanings. Its centrality is emphasized because it defines the most basic 
element in social and spatial relations. 
 The traditional discourse on hospitality is rooted in two religious and theological notions, 
namely, that the stranger is divine and merits absolute respect from their host, and that the host is 
prohibited from having economic relations with the stranger. However, these notions are no 
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longer influential. Hospitality has become commodified in such institutions as the “hospitality 
industry” which treats hospitality as an economic act. Furthermore, modern social and political 
discourse no longer treats the stranger with absolute respect; rather, they construe the stranger as 
a hostile and threatening invader that arouses fear, anxiety and hatred. It may be that there is 
something archaic about hospitality, which is inseparable from religion – a nostalgic yearning for 
a lost sense of social harmony. Despite this anachronism, it appears that hospitality has become a 
central and important idea in relation to various ethical questions. 
 The connection between location and ethics is integral to Lévinas’ concept of dwelling, 
which involves an ethical relationship between a person and the other. Yet, the origin of this 
connection is not immediately apparent. Martin Heidegger, who greatly influenced Lévinas’ 
thinking, explicitly outlined this connection. In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger traced the 
word “ethics” back to its root “ethos,” which means place or habitat. For Heidegger ethics is the 
way in which a person dwells in the world in relation to the divine. However, whereas Heidegger 
focused on dwelling as en ethical relationship with the divine, Lévinas posits dwelling as a 
relationship between a subject and the other.  Heidegger maintains that “ethical” speech must not 
use terminology steeped in the traditional meaning of ethics: 
 
If the name “ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should now 
say that “ethics” ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of 
Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original 
ethics. (Letter 234-35)  
 
He contends that previous ways of positing ethics have failed, albeit in different ways, in their 
attempts to expose and explicitly explore the issue of Being. They were unsuccessful in 
considering man’s essential ethos because they did not consider the relationship between Being 
and dwelling as crucial to existence. The theme of traditional Western ethics therefore, 
developed as the logic of customs rather than as the logos of the ethos.1 Heidegger separates the 
notions of morality and ethics. For him, the ethical principle relates to behavior and free conduct, 
to the historical becoming of human beings. His criticism rejects the moral principle, which 
caused a degeneration of ethos, the original foundation of ethics.2   
 Ethos is the Greek root of the term ethics, and it originally means a place or area to which 
animals return. Ethos is not necessarily a place of residence – a specific house, plot, county, or 
                                            
1 For further reading on this subject see Bernard Boele, “The Question of Ethics in the Thought of Martin 
Heidegger” (Frings 99-103). 
2 The source of this degeneration lies in Plato’s philosophy, since his thinking has deconstructed the original 
thinking of Being into separate lines of science in which the whole being has been forgotten in favor of particular 
knowledge. Thus, logic and ethics were “born” as separate disciplines. Such thinking forgets that it is thinking about 
Being. According to Heidegger, it is not necessary to write laws and books on ethics in order to preserve the original 
ethos, which is better preserved if not talked about, as the short story about Heraclitus proves (Heidegger, Letter 
195-96, 233-34). 
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nation – but rather a dwelling, a place where a person feels “at home.” Heidegger turns to a quote 
from Heraclitus in order to explain the original meaning of ethos: 
 
A saying of Heraclitus which consists of only three words says something so simply that 
from it the essence of the ethos immediately comes to light. The saying of Heraclitus 
(Fragment 119) goes: ethos anthropoi daimon. This is usually translated, “A man’s 
character is his daimon.” This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. Ethos 
means abode, dwelling place. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to man’s 
essence, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear… The fragment 
says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god. (Heidegger, An 
Introduction 256; emphasis in original) 
 
Heidegger notes the mistranslation of Heraclitus in order to emphasize that ethos refers to the 
nature – the character or traits – of something. He goes on to explain that in ancient Greece ethos 
meant dwelling or abode, an open area where man resides. Thus, Heraclitus’ saying should have 
been translated: “Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god.” We learn from 
Heraclitus, via Heidegger, that dwelling involves that which is essential to man: his proximity to 
God. 
 Heidegger then turns to a story that appears in Aristotle,3 which recounts the tale of strangers 
who visit Heraclitus. Upon their arrival, they catch Heraclitus enjoying the warmth of a stove. 
The visitors, embarrassed by the encounter, stop in the entranceway and stare at him. Heraclitus 
notices them and invites them in, saying, “Here too the gods are present.” At first glance, the 
visitors are surprised by what they see. It is strange to see the philosopher engaged in the 
mundane, and this impression conflicts with the expectation that a philosopher should be 
engaged in an exalted pursuit. The divergence between expectation and reality produces the urge 
to stall and perhaps leave. Heraclitus, who sees the disappointment on their faces, encourages 
them to enter by saying that here, in this situation, the gods reside as well. Heraclitus’ response 
to the embarrassment of his visitors demonstrates that even the gods can be hosted in mundane 
circumstances. Although the dwelling is a familiar place, it is open to the presence of God, to 
that which is unknown. It should be clear by now that the difference between Heidegger and 
Lévinas with regard to dwelling does not concern the lack of an ethical dimension in the 
philosophy of the former – since as we have seen this is present in the story of Heraclitus. 
However, the ethical in Heidegger does not refer to the subject’s relation to the other, but to the 
way the subject relates to Being and the world. 
 The concept of hospitality raises important ethical questions with regards to space and place, 
and at present there is renewed interest in the concept. Current debates regarding hospitality are 
not simply rooted in a nostalgic sense of longing for social harmony. Rather, they respond to the 
                                            
3 See Heidegger (Being 256) and Aristotle (On the Parts I, 5, 645a 17ft).  
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tension that arises when a sense of personal or shared group identity must confront an unnamed 
sense of otherness. In recent years, a growing body of research responding to this tension has 
emerged, which includes, for example, papers focusing on the way in which urban policy should 
address the steady immigration of migrant workers and their families to more economically 
developed countries, a phenomenon that has changed the face of Europe.4   
 The ethics of hospitality represents the challenge of “impossible” relationships without a 
constitutive principle. It demands that hosts let strangers into their homes while simultaneously 
respecting their foreignness. The discussion of hospitality is important to this paper because 
hospitality is the act through which the home reinforces itself by turning outward. However, the 
encounter with that which cannot be named suggests that hospitality is already based on the 
primacy of significant internal relationships beyond identity. It both allows the building of an 
identity and challenges it. 
 The paper is divided into two main parts: The first part of the paper draws on the thought of 
Lévinas to demonstrate how the notions of hospitality and the home structure human 
ambivalence. The home separates humans from the anonymity of the natural world. It is the 
condition for the establishment of the subject: “The privileged role of the home does not consist 
in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its 
commencement” (Lévinas, Totality 152). Lévinas reveals the character of the subject by 
examining their attitude to the world, to the home. For Lévinas, expressions of home, 
homeliness, and hospitality contribute to the significance of being in the world. The home makes 
entry and exit possible and thus allows the subject to welcome others. The second part explores 
the implications that this line of thinking has on the field of architecture, particularly the way in 
which it challenges the concept of the facade as a flat frame. I propose that the building facade 
should be understood as a boundary that, at its core, is marked by an essential conflict; yet, this 
tension enables it to become a space of hospitality. 
 
Part 1 
 According to Lévinas, acts of hospitality are ethical because they demonstrate an openness 
towards complete alterity, transcendence from the boundaries of subjectivity, and movement 
towards infinity, towards God. Hospitality as an event occurs between self and other and 
therefore contains an inherent tension. On the one hand, hospitality means greeting the other into 
                                            
4 In his book The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, Jacques Derrida emphasizes the contradictory 
nature of the duty of hospitality – a duty that dictates the welcoming of foreigners with the objective of integrating 
them, while at the same time respecting their foreignness (76-78). He writes: “That same duty dictates respecting 
differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, 
agreement and univocity [. . .] ” (77).  He suggests that these two perceptions of duty compete with each other and 
currently divide European national consciousness, thus reflecting the characteristic of mutual contradiction of any 
act of hospitality. The ethics of hospitality therefore conflict with the “laws of hospitality.” Whereas the former 
emphasizes respect for the fundamental foreignness of the other, the latter emphasizes the conventions of Western 
civilization, its personal, political or community identity and the formal laws that regulate the civil, commercial and 
interpersonal relations therein. 
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one’s home, accepting and welcoming the otherness of the other. On the other hand, by 
welcoming the other, hosts jeopardize the safety of their homes and property. This tension stands 
at the basis of Lévinas’ innovative understanding of subjectivity. As he sums it up, almost 
aphoristically, in the preface to Totality and Infinity, “This book will present subjectivity as 
welcoming the Other, as hospitality” (Totality 27). 
 In contrast to the metaphysical tradition, according to which subjectivity always involves the 
reduction and dissolution of otherness, Lévinas understands subjectivity in terms of hospitality. 
At the same time, he insists that a pre-condition for hospitality is the constitution of an 
independent host with a defined sense of identity, an “I” that dwells in the world and who is at 
home with oneself [chez soi] (Totality 37).5 The home, according to Lévinas, does not merely 
contain the subject; rather, it is the very site of the constitution of the I can (Totality 143-44). The 
home allows one to distance oneself from the elements: “Through the home our relation with 
space as distance and extension is substituted for the simple bathing in the element” (Totality 
132). This distance creates the separation that is necessary to perceive something as an object. 
By forming this separation, the home allows the subject to bestow meaning on things.  
 The home is the place where nature can be approached as an object. Although people cannot 
abandon the elements and completely depart from nature, they can build homes for themselves 
that do not allow the elements immediate access. The four walls of the home hinder the elements 
of the outside world from affecting the inhabitant of a home. Thus, the home allows the subject 
to maintain a separate identity from the world at large. Lévinas places the emphasis on one being 
at home with oneself, and not on one being at home in the world. Lévinas attributes the home to 
the world, but the subject is not at home in the world but rather at home with himself in the 
world.6 The subject lives by themselves at home and only then turns to the world. In other words, 
a person is separated from the world while being in and dependent on the world. People do not 
go out into the world as foreign, homeless beings, but rather as dwelling beings.  
 It should be emphasized, however, that being in the home is an ambiguous state because, to a 
certain extent, it is a state of being that is simultaneously inside and outside. On the one hand it 
creates a separation between the subject and the outside world. The home creates a border that, 
once crossed, offers the subject a space for recollection. On the other hand, although the home 
separates the subject from the world, it also allows the subject to accept the foreigner, who 
comes from the world outside the home. The ambiguity of the home is derived from its ability to 
simultaneously offer a space for recollection while at the same time facilitating the possibility for 
the subject to accept alterity (Lévinas, Totality 148). 
 The home belongs to the subject’s interiority but does not belong to her internal closeness. In 
other words, the home is like the interiority’s foyer: “Circulating between visibility and 
                                            
5 The English translation of chez soi, which is Lévinas’ expression for the concrete form in which an existent comes 
to exist, is “at home with oneself.” The justification for this is Lévinas’ interest in the concept of the home. 
6 This differs from Heidegger who called the act of existence “Being in the world” [In-der-Welt-sein] and for whom 
the existential characteristic of human being is being in the world. 
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invisibility, one is always bound for the interior of which one’s home, one’s corner, one’s tent, or 
one’s cave is the vestibule” (Lévinas, Totality 156). It serves as a liminal space where the 
subject’s interiority can come into contact with the other by allowing the stranger access. For 
Lévinas, the role of the home is twofold; on the one hand it is the place that provides the 
condition for developing a sense of interiority, and, on the other hand, it sets the condition for 
creating a sense of openness towards alterity. In order to demonstrate how Lévinas views such a 
home, I will first offer a short description of the process by which the subject comes into being 
from the element. 
 
1.1 The Element 
 Nature or, as Lévinas calls it, the element, is anonymous; it is the hylic medium from which 
things emerge and to which they return (Existence and Existents 8). It does not belong to a 
particular person, and like water, earth, light and even the city, it is in principle, inalienable. We 
are in sensuous contact with the element; it envelops us: “[T]he adequate relation with the 
element is precisely bathing” (Lévinas, Totality 132). Lévinas likens contact with the element to 
being immersed in liquid, an experience that provokes sensations that we cannot attribute to any 
particular cause. As the subject cannot distance themselves from the element, the element lacks 
an outline or any other quality that would allow it to be grasped. It should also be noted that 
distance is necessary in order to grasp anything.  
 The act of building allows the subject to overcome their absolute proximity to the element. 
The home is a semi-internal space that surrounds the subject and separates them from the 
element. The world lacks objective reality prior to building the home. The home dissolves the 
element, which facilitates the relationship between humans and the world. Lévinas says that the 
home creates intimacy against the anonymity of the element: “To dwell is not the simple fact of 
the anonymous reality of being cast into existence as a stone one casts behind oneself; it is a 
recollection, a coming to oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in a land of refuge, which 
answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a human welcome” (Totality 156). By understanding 
nature as anonymous, Lévinas separates himself from thinkers who envision the home as a 
bridge to nature or an expression of the original human state. If nature is anonymous, as Lévinas 
claims, then the intimacy of the home is the opposite. 
 
1.2 Enjoyment: The Formation of the Subject 
 According to Lévinas, the subject is first and foremost a body and, as such, it is in direct 
contact with the world. Subjects become who they are through enjoyment. The notion of 
enjoyment expresses the primary relation that humans have toward their existence and discloses 
the fact that human lives are valuable: “We live from ‘good soup,’ air, light, spectacles, work, 
ideas, sleep, etc… These are not objects of representations. We live from them” (Totality 110). 
Lévinas describes inwardness as a dimension of a living subjectivity that is intimately linked to 
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an outside that nourishes it.7 Nourishment is the concrete foundation to which life is already 
bound; Lévinas calls it “objects of enjoyment” (Totality 111). This does not mean hedonistic 
pleasure, but rather the fundamental structure of life. Sorrow and pain sustain us as well; they too 
nourish us and fill our lives with value.  
 
1.3 Caring about Tomorrow  
 The external things that nourish us become the basic components of our lives and identities; 
they shape us as independent entities. However, their presence is constrained by constant 
insecurities. At the heart of the enjoying self stands a restless self.  The self worries about 
tomorrow and this worry weakens one’s sense of security. We constantly worry that our sense of 
enjoyment will cease. Hence, humans position themselves in the world in an anxious, troubled 
and restless manner, constantly on guard, facing an unknown future (Lévinas, Totality 149-50). 
 The act of building a home allows the inhabitant to hold onto their nourishment. The home 
prevents restlessness and anxiety from causing the self to collapse back into the element. Hence, 
the home’s primary role is to break the element by creating a utopia.  In Lévinas, a utopia is a 
non-topos: a non-place at the heart of place. It is the separation of the self from the world. This 
separation is formed through the subject’s enjoyment, by the fact that the subject is independent 
and sentient. According to Lévinas, one does not approach the world directly from the world, but 
from a place outside the world, from the utopia of the home (Totality 157). The utopia is created 
when the inwardness of the subject, the mental space, is projected outward, so to speak. Lévinas 
is not an idealist who thinks being at home is simply a metaphor for the psyche. The home is a 
spatial entity; it is the concrete expression of human inwardness. The material home is therefore 
a portico to human inwardness, a gateway to subjectivity.  
 In addition to separating humans from the element or from nature, the home also allows 
representation, ownership and even ethics to ensue. This is because the home creates distance, 
which is fundamental for all three actions to transpire. Since the element is inseparable from 
humans, only building a home can create distance between them.  
 As independent, psychic creatures, humans develop relationships with their environment, 
relationships marked by ownership, labor and representation. One cannot distance oneself from 
one’s body as one does from the home; hence, one does not relate to one’s body in terms of 
ownership and labor. The body consumes whatever comes its way; it digests the element 
completely. The space of the home, on the other hand, allows one to leave things suspended. The 
home takes things in but does not absorb them: “The element is fixed between the four walls of 
the home, is calmed in possession. It appears there as a thing” (Lévinas, Totality 158).  
 
                                            
7 Nourishment is a metaphor; we are nourished by more than just food. On the home as a link between human and 
the world see (Kelly 151-68). 
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1.4 The Feminine 
 The home is the location of intimacy. The intimacy of the home contrasts with both the 
anonymity of the element – of nature – and the anonymity of modernity, which favors the ideals 
of technology and rationality over the traditional values of family and home. Lévinas expresses 
apprehension towards both causes of anonymity – the natural and the technological – since both 
impoverish human experience.  Unlike Heidegger, Lévinas does not offer a mythical connection 
to the earth as a means of counteracting anonymity.8 Rather, he suggests establishing intimacy 
through human connection, which in turn fortifies the home.   
 The home can seem to be an element that contains or separates the subject from the world. 
However, the movement into the home does not signify parting from the world but suspending 
the world in a way that allows one to return to it. The movement inward, into the home is 
egoistic in nature. According to Lévinas, this movement makes hospitality – the act of being 
receptive to an outside world – possible. He calls the act of retreating from the outside and 
entering into the home a feminine movement: “To dwell is not the simple fact of the anonymous 
reality…it is a recollection… a retreat home with oneself as in a land of refuge, which answers to 
a hospitality, an expectancy, a human welcome” (Totality 156). Dwelling facilitates the subject’s 
capacity for self-reflection.9 Furthermore, it provides a place from which the subject can open 
themselves to the environment, a possibility that is not self-evident. The intimacy of dwelling 
does not merely belong to the closed circuit of selfhood; one is not merely intimate with one’s 
self. The intimacy of the home is a testimony to the intimacy one has with others, with the 
feminine element (Lévinas, Totality 155). The domestic element that characterizes subjectivity is 
linked to prior human presence. Lévinas’ references to this dimension are vague. He does not 
explain the human presence as fundamental to the formation of the subject in detail.10 
 The feminine dimension makes the building into a home.  The home welcomes all those who 
enter, its door is open and welcoming. Concerning this hospitality, Lévinas writes: “This refers 
us to its essential interiority, and to the inhabitant that inhabits it before every inhabitant, the 
welcoming one par excellence, welcome in itself—the feminine being” (Totality 157). The event 
of the feminine precedes the revelation of the other, precedes the transcendental relationship with 
others. Moreover, it is the condition for the relationship with the other: “This presence [of the 
feminine] includes all the possibilities of the transcendent relationship with the other” (Lévinas, 
Totality 155). In the context of this paper, the feminine dimension is the condition for the 
possibility of ethical relations. The feminine dimension of the home enables relations with the 
                                            
8 In this respect it is possible to see that Lévinas objects to Heidegger’s conception of place and home. 
9 In Lévinas’ vernacular recueillement may be interpreted as contemplation, as an observing into the soul. 
10 As part of this essay I will not address topics and critiques relating to femininity in Lévinas’ philosophy. For an 
expansion on this subject see: Luce Irigaray, “The Fecundity of the Caress: A Reading of Lévinas, Totality and 
Infinity, Phenomenology of Eros” (Chanter 119-45); Stella Sandford, “Lévinas, Feminism and Feminine” 
(Critchley, Cambridge 139-60); Catherine Chalier, “Ethics and the Feminine” (Critchley, Re-Reading 119-29); Tina 
Chanter, “Feminism and the Other” (Bernasconi 32-56). 
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other. Windows and doors allow entry and exit through the boundaries of the home, thus 
facilitating hospitality – the welcoming of the other. 
 
1.5 The Revelation of the Other’s Face 
 Hospitality opens the home, and thus the subject, to absolute otherness, to a realm that, 
according to Lévinas, is outside the subject’s totality. The encounter with the other constitutes a 
transcendental relationship. The other comes from the outside and enters the home. This event 
reveals that the home can never be completely private.  
 Like Heidegger, Lévinas expressed dismay for the tendency in modernity to devalue the ideal 
of the home. However, while Heidegger interprets the absence of the home as an ontological 
symptom of abandoning Being, Lévinas views this absence as a reminder of man’s failure to 
comply with his moral commitment towards the other. For Lévinas, the absence of the home is 
an ethical problem. Individuals did not lose their homes because they failed to listen to the call of 
Being. Rather, they were torn from their homes because of the deprivation, political revolutions, 
and war that modernity brought with it.11 
 In the context of the chaos of modernity, it seems obvious to think of the home as of refuge 
that enables the subject to retreat within themselves. However, it can also allow the subject to 
become open to the other. The other can pass through the door of the home, welcomed by the 
façade, which should be understood as an ambiguous place, simultaneously inside and outside. 
The subject confronts the other. This encounter creates distance between the self and objects; 
those objects that became one’s own because of their location in the home. In order to retreat 
from one’s involvement with things, one needs to not only refrain from enjoying material 
objects, but also give them up as possessions. This requires an encounter with otherness, with a 
transcendent and absolute other. The other challenges claims of ownership and loosens the 
subject’s hold on material goods and possessions by putting forth the imperative “thou shalt not 
kill” (Lévinas, Totality 199). The face of the other commands that I care for her, warns me not to 
harm her – she not only prohibits murder, but also greed and stinginess. 
 Unlike worldly objects, which are, in principle, always within our reach, the face of the other 
has a hidden dimension that forever escapes us, says Lévinas. The only way to come in contact 
with this dimension is by developing an ethical relation to the other. Humans always understand 
their place in the world vis-à-vis their relation to others. Hence, according to Lévinas, it is not the 
land or walls that make a home, but the fact that it has doors and windows, through which guests 
may enter.  
 
Part 2  
  In the context of a paper that connects architecture and philosophy, it should be noted that it 
often seems that Lévinas uses the concepts dwelling and home metaphorically. However, this 
                                            
11 Derrida writes that Lévinas did not deal in these subjects, rather, solely in his philosophy, and he never looked 
away from the violence and hardship experienced by the refugee, the foreigner and the exile. (Derrida, Adieu 64). 
 
The Boundaries of Spatial Separation   237 
 
 
does not mean that these ideas are independent of, or outside, the world. The home is a concrete 
entity in the world and, as such, it should be analyzed phenomenologically.12 Dwelling and home 
should not be reduced to a series of characteristics that can be applied to various objects.  
 Lévinas criticizes the tendency to treat the human face as if it were the facade of a building: 
“The notion of facade [is] borrowed from building… By the facade the thing which keeps its 
secret is exposed enclosed in its monumental essence and in its myth, in which it gleams like a 
splendor but does not deliver itself” (Totality 193). I am standing at a piazza facing the facade of 
a broad, short building. There are many windows and doors on this facade, and yet it is blind. 
Who does it address? Whose gaze does it capture? Facade is an architectural term – the front part 
of a building. A building’s facade, which is midway between the outside and the inside, can be 
interpreted in numerous ways. If the facade is seen as the inside of the building, it expresses the 
building’s inner contents, contents that it simultaneously conceals (see fig. 1). For Lévinas, this 
signifies that the facade is a “flat” screen onto which the building’s interiority is projected. This 
implies that it is conceived as a frame that represents the interior of the building, an interior 
designed to meet certain needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. “Office Building in St Louis.” Pexels, www.pexels.com/. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019. Copyright free image. 
                                            
12 As Lévinas attests to his method: 
The method practiced here does indeed consist in seeking the condition of empirical situations, but it leads to the 
developments called empirical, in which the conditioning possibility is accomplished. It thus leads to concretization, 
an ontological role that specifies the meaning of the fundamental possibility, a meaning invisible in that condition. 
(Lévinas, Totality 173) 
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An office building, for example, has a facade that expresses its interiority, the fact that it is a 
place of work. The people who use it have a standardized and unchanging relation to it, which 
was planned in advance. However, this is not the only way to “read” facades. A facade can also 
be interpreted as a space that preserves the tension between the inward movement of entering 
into the home and receptivity to the external, which is implicated in welcoming the other.  
The architectural object is not a static entity and movement is integral to the way we perceive 
it, and the facade should not be understood as a static screen. Facades have features that open 
and close and allow entry and exit such as doors and windows (see fig. 2). Lévinas describes the 
home as a fundamental existential condition, which preserves inward and outward movement. 
This movement is “at the same time open and closed” (Totality 148). It allows the self to separate 
from the world while also maintaining a transcendent relationship with otherness through 
hospitality (Totality 148-49). 
 
 
Fig. 2. “Doors and windows; street in Archness.” Pexels, www.pexels.com/-. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019. Copyright free image. 
 
 Doors and windows are common architectural elements that we encounter in daily life. These 
architectural thresholds frame our lives: we enter and exit buildings through doors; we feel 
secure at home because of our ability to close the door to the outside world; we maintain a 
relationship with the outside through the window, which we can open and close allowing air, 
light, and sounds to enter the home. We move in and out of homes. In fact, the “inward/outward” 
movement is made possible only through these openings. Doors and windows define the inside 
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and outside of our existential space. They separate us from and connect us to the outside (see fig. 
3). Without doors or windows, the home does not exist. Closed doors disclose the fact that they 
can, in principle, be opened. Hence, the door is ambiguous: it defines the inside and separates a 
space from the outside, distinguishing the private and the public sphere, and, yet, it also allows 
movement from the enclosed interior to the outside world. Thus, the door is without a doubt 
more than a limit between interior and exterior spaces.  
 
 
Fig. 3. “A window in Tel-Aviv.” Photography by Joel Pearl. Permission granted. 
 
 Let us consider the facade’s window. Like the door, the window both defines an inside and 
opens to an outside. Like doors, windows are openings in walls. However, the two differ 
significantly, the body carries out the inside/outside movement through the door, whereas the 
eyes allow us to look outside through the window: “The ambiguity of distance, both removal and 
connection, is lifted by the window that makes possible a look that dominates, a look of him who 
escapes looks, the look that contemplates” (Lévinas, Totality 156). A window can be open or 
shut. When shut, those inside look outside through the window’s frame. The window then seems 
to define how the outside appears. This explains why we often reduce the singularity of the other 
to a set of properties that appear through a certain frame. While the act of opening a window 
changes something in the building – the basic dichotomy between inside and outside is traversed, 
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with outside entering inside – the change is significant mostly for those who are inside the home 
(see fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 4. “Gazing through the window.” Pexels, www.pexels.com/-. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019. Copyright free image. 
 
 It seems, then, that after entering the home, the subject establishes their connection to the 
outside world by gazing through the window. In fact, one can also do the opposite. After entering 
the home the subject can shut the windows and withdraw into the interior space, which is now 
completely uninterrupted by the outside. However, this withdrawal can be interrupted by the 
entryway, by the possibility of the door (see fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5. “A threshold.” Photography by Edna Langenthal. Permission granted. 
 
 The door is first and foremost a threshold, and it therefore erects a place through which one 
can withdraw. At the same time, the door points to a fundamental crack in this closed space. 
Whoever is outside can knock on my door. In Lévinas’ words, “This presence consists in coming 
toward us, in making an entry. It can be put in this way: the phenomenon of the Other’s (Autrui) 
aspiration is also a face, or … the epiphany of a face is a visitation” (Basic Philosophical 53). 
The appearance of the other and the entry of the face are part of a movement. They are not 
simply given parts of the visual field. They do not appear to us like signs hung on buildings in 
the city, nor are they hidden from us like objects in the building that we cannot see when we are 
outside. In prearranged social, cultural, and political contexts, we generally recognize the face of 
the other when it appears before us. Lévinas argues that the visitation of the other is a kind of 
movement; as the face comes closer and we recognize it, we experience the act of recognition as 
an epiphany. The etymological root of the word face – panim (םינפ( in Hebrew is panah )הנפ), 
which is related to the verb that means turning toward – peniyya. In Hebrew, the face is 
associated with movement; it represents the action of turning toward or facing someone.  
 A visit often begins with someone knocking on the door, appearing on the threshold. This is 
the site where the simultaneous movement of withdrawing inside and welcoming the other takes 
place. It is a transitional space that disrupts all continuity. An architecture based on this 
conception of otherness needs to reconcile the tension between one’s rights and the rights of the 
other. Architectural culture ought to conceptualize dwelling spaces where the tensions and 
242  Edna Langenthal 
 
 
oppositions between outer and inner, public and private, the open and the closed are expressed 
and manifested together. 
 
2.1 The Urban Setting as a Place of Despair and Hope 
 For Lévinas, the city simultaneously stimulates despair and hope, which blur its inhabitants’ 
attitudes towards otherness. This idea is connected to his critique of Western philosophy, which, 
he claims, does not allow for the presence of radical alterity because it posits a unified structure 
of subjectivity that excludes genuine otherness. For Lévinas, dwelling is an interior dimension 
defined from the outside. The subject or “I” lives in the world as someone who has a home, as an 
independent creature who nevertheless exists within this world. Human beings reside in this 
world “as if” they belong to the private domain, to their home. Being at home is significant 
because it affords each person an independent identity. For Lévinas, the relationship between the 
home and the world is not harmoniously unified; rather, the home preserves a separate, 
individual identity. These separations enable economic life. Labor allows the subject to relate to 
the outside world and cooperate with the other. This relation typically takes the form or bartering 
and exchanging money, which are mediums of mutuality and symmetry. According to Lévinas, 
mutual and symmetrical exchange is unethical because ethics are characterized by asymmetric 
generosity. Hospitality is a prime example of this structure. 
 Lévinas focuses his critique of the external lifestyle on the institution of the “coffeehouse,” 
which is an inseparable part of modern, urban life. He writes, “The café is a place of casual 
social intercourse, without mutual responsibility. One goes in not needing to. One sits down 
without being tired. One drinks without being thirsty” (Nine Talmudic 111-12). The coffeehouse 
is problematic because it welcomes guests in exchange for money, transforming hospitality into a 
consumable product and, in the process, confusing economics and ethics. 
 In the modern urban space, others are often ignored since they lack the capital required to 
consume products or receive qualifications. They arouse fear and thus warp our illusion of the 
safe interior. However, Lévinas still believes in an ethical urban space. Urban areas are 
geographically confined spaces that bring together people from heterogeneous cultures. If the 
city is to function, these diverse individuals must interact with each other in an ethical way.  
 Cities, as he writes in “Judaism and Revolution,” “emerged from a void; they are without a 
past, with populations so mixed and individuals so dispersed that all traditions were lost” (Nine 
Talmudic 129). Lévinas is known for the ethical turn that he brought to philosophy, and his 
ethics are based on a unique understanding of the other, on the recognition of radical otherness 
towards which traditional thought remains closed. Moreover, he opposed certain aspects of 
urbanism in which we forget, ignore, and turn our back on the demand of the otherness 
constantly present in our lives, the otherness of the other person. According to Lévinas, a home 
where the presence of the other is not attended to is not truly a home. 
 In this paper I attempted to challenge the idea that building facades, which make up the urban 
space, are an external visage – flat partitions separating the private interior from the public 
exterior in a binary fashion. In the final section of the paper I demonstrated that the threshold is 
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the boundary, a place of conflict where the ethical event of hospitality occurs. This is derived 
from Lévinas’ theory, which exposes the complexity of the concept of home and the threshold as 
a place sustaining the conflict between the self and the other. This is the event that preserves the 
tension between the subject and the outside world. When inside the home, the inhabitant is on the 
one hand shut off from the events of the outside, but on the other hand they can welcome the 
other. Therefore, urban spaces can be planned hospitably if we understand that the underlying 
basis of the city is conflictual in structure, that it is in essence a “threshold” or a doorway. In 
other words, planners must recognize that these conflicts are inherent parts of the city that must 
be considered in the planning process. As such, planning for these conflicts undermines the 
hegemonic perception of the urban space and makes room for the internal tensions through 
which the city reveals itself as pluralistic. In conclusion, unless planners reassess hospitality as 
inherent to the urban, cities are destined to become unethical places. 
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